conjured up by metaphysics between the living, qua consciousness, and the non-living, qua animals and machines, or animal-machines. This implication opens up the history of life, as leaving a trace in the world, and the history of its evolution, from the most elementary forms of living to consciousness. Therefore, Derrida argues, the deconstruction of metaphysics through the formula of the trace allows us to liberate the history of life: we can tell this history only by starting from the trace.
In the pages that follow, I put this argument to the test and point to its repercussions-for example, for ethico-political questions of responsibility-by focusing on two key moments in Derrida's work: the deconstruction of the phenomenological concept of voice and the deconstruction of the so-called Cartesian conception of human auto-relation (autodeictic autotelicity). These moments are chronologically thirty years apart and yet, as we will see, are interwoven by Derrida himself in the act of sketching his intellectual autobiography. 1 As my reading develops, we understand that the liberation of the history of life is a consequence of the deconstruction of the metaphysical project at stake in phenomenology, which consists in dissimulating the entanglement of consciousness and the trace. From this deconstruction, it follows that we can only think of consciousness as an effect of the trace and that we must reinscribe within the liberated history of life metaphysical distinctions such as those between reaction and response, or between automation and freedom, which in turn hinge on the metaphysical concept of consciousness.
II.
Let us start by examining how, since his first deconstructive work, Voice and Phenomenon (1967; hereafter VP), Derrida allows himself to tell the history of life as leaving a trace in the world through the deconstruction of the phenomenological concept of voice. constitutes the historical achievement of the originary metaphysical project. 3 As he suggests, we can identify the central motif of this critique as the denunciation of metaphysical perversions in the understanding of the authentic mode of ideality. For Husserl, ideality consists in the form in which the presence of the object can be repeated indefinitely as identical to itself. By definition, this form does not exist (it is non-real, unreal, etc.) to the extent that it does not depend on an empirical or worldly existence. 4 Now, Derrida goes on, the possibility of the ideal form and thus of the indefinite repetition of the presence of the object as identical to itself can be secured only in the presence of the living present or the self-presence of transcendental life. Therefore, for Husserl, the latter constitutes the ultimate form of ideality. Derrida summarizes this convergence of ideality, the living present, and transcendental life as follows:
So that the possibility of this repetition can be open idealiter to infinity, it is necessary that one ideal form secures this unity of the indefinitely and the idealiter: this is the present, or rather the presence of the living present. The ultimate form of ideality, the one in which in the last analysis we can anticipate or recall all repetition, the ideality of ideality is the living present, the self-presence of transcendental life. (VP 5-6)
The phenomenological concept of consciousness is structurally linked to the claim for an authentic mode of ideality. As the ideal form grants the presence of the object to consciousness, consciousness is determined by the very possibility of ideality and, ultimately, by the presence of the living present. 5 Difficulties arise when Husserl allows that the ideal object is the historical product of a constitutive act of language and that consciousness consists in the possibility of this act. Does it follow from this that the element of consciousness and the element of language are indiscernible, and thus that the presence of transcendental life is originarily divided by the worldly and empirical synthesis of language?
In Derrida's words, "is it not the case that their indiscernibility will introduce non-presence and difference (mediacy, the sign, referral, etc.) right into the heart of self-presence?" (VP 13). Derrida argues that Husserl addresses this difficulty by appealing to the concept of voice (voix). However, he explains, this difficulty does not represent a weakness immanent to the Husserlian system. Rather, although Husserl shares the appeal to voice with the whole history of metaphysics, his concept of phenomenological voice brings this history to its most refined achievement. Phenomenological voice, in fact, does not seem to require a worldly synthesis and thus would protect transcendental life from the threat of non-presence and difference implicit in the indiscernibility of language and consciousness. Derrida formalizes the Husserlian solution to metaphysical difficulty par excellence as follows: "Husserl will not recognize an originative affinity with the logos in general in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, or in the body of the voice in the world; rather the originative affinity will be recognized in the phenomenological voice, in the voice in its transcendental flesh" (VP 14).
Derrida draws this concept of phenomenological voice from Husserl's well-known distinction between Anzeichen, the so-called index/indication, the sign that does not express anything because it does not convey meaning (Bedeutung), and Ausdruck, or expression. 6 Voice designates the phenomenological situation in which this distinction is accomplished and expression is no longer entangled with indication. Given the irreducibility of this entanglement in worldly or empirical communication-for reasons that will appear evident in a moment-this situation can only be found "in a language without communication, in a monological discourse, in the absolutely lowest register of the voice of the 'solitary life of the soul'" (VP 19). Derrida explains that the condition for this situation is a certain relation to the ideal object, "the relation to the object, the aim of an objective ideality, over and against the intention of meaning [vouloir-dire], over and against the Bedeutungsintention" (VP 19). This relation constitutes the phenomenological project in its essence-that is, the phenomenological idea of transcendental idealism. 7 Disentangled and pure expression secures the exteriorization-still within consciousness and not in the world-of this relation to the object. There, as Derrida puts it, the voice animated by intention expresses the intended object. 8 Derrida offers a close reading of the progressive reductions of indication by means of which Husserl delimits the access to pure expression. As these reductions develop, he points out that indication designates the fact that the animating intention present to itself in transcendental life (namely, psychē or spirit) goes out of itself and thus relates to nonpresence, difference, and, ultimately, death. But this relation to death accounts for the very process of signification and, more precisely, of writing, the latter being the sign that works beyond and thanks to the absence of its animating intention. By reducing indication and thus, as we anticipated, by appealing to pure expression and phenomenological voice, Husserl wishes, according to Derrida, to dissimulate the relation to death that is at work in signs-namely, the originary and irreducible possibility of writing that Derrida designates as archi-writing. I quote this long passage as it constitutes a key moment in the deconstructive reading of the phenomenological concept of sign:
Pure expressivity will be the pure active intention (spirit, psyche, life, will) of a bedeuten that is animating a discourse whose content (Bedeutung) will be present. It is present not in nature, since indication alone takes place in nature and in space, but in consciousness. Therefore it is present to an "internal" intuition or to an "internal"
perception. But we just understood why it is present to an intuition that is not that of the other in a case of communication. Therefore this is self-present in the life of a present that has still not exited from itself into the world, into space, into nature. With all of these "exitings" exiling this life of self-presence into indication, we can be sure that indication, which covers so far nearly the entire surface of language, is the process of death at work in the signs. (VP 34) 9 At this point, we wonder how phenomenological voice is supposed to respond to the difficulty of metaphysics-that is, to the threat of death implicit in the process of signification and thus in idealization. To what extent, as Derrida puts it, "between idealization and the voice, the complicity is here unfailing" (VP 64)? A medium is required to preserve the two features of authentic ideality: "the presence of the object in front of the intuition and the presence to oneself, the absolute proximity of the acts to themselves" (VP 65). This medium would be an exteriorization of transcendental life in which voice does not go out of itself and, therefore, does not undergo the work of death. But that seems to be precisely phenomenological voice in the way its phenomenon is given, in its proximity to the speaking subject in the present moment of enunciation. 10 Phenomenological voice thus seems to account for a kind of auto-relation (for-itself, or subjectivity), that of the "I" hearing itself speak, which preserves the self-presence of transcendental life and for which Derrida takes recourse to the concept of auto-affection. "Why is the phoneme the most 'ideal' of signs?"
(VP 66), Derrida asks. Because the being in the present of the phonic signifier retains the latter close to the animating intention, thus seeming to prevent it from going out of itself and relating to its death. Derrida writes:
The signifier that is animated by my breath and by the intention of signification (in Husserlian language the expression animated by the Bedeutungsintention) is absolutely close to to me. The living act, the act that gives life, the Lebendigkeit that animates the body of the signifier and transforms it into an expression that wants to say, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself, from its presence to itself. The soul of language does not risk death in the body of a signifier abandoned to the world and to the visibility of space. (VP 66-67) 11 Therefore, phenomenological voice aims to respond to the difficulty represented by the indistinguishability of consciousness and language. The pure auto-affection of the I's hearing itself speak displays the very meaning of the term "con-sciousness"-that is, the possibility of the indefinite repetition of the object as identical to itself and, ultimately, the self-presence of transcendental life. "The voice is being close to itself in the form of universality, as con- Phenomenological voice is the most ideal of signs, but it is still a sign-that is, a worldly synthesis, which carries non-presence and difference within pure auto-affection.
"Auto-affection as the operation of the voice," Derrida writes, "assumed that a pure difference came to divide self-presence" (VP 70). Here we discover the movement of "différance" that inhabits the living present. This movement opens up transcendental life onto what is supposed to be suspended by transcendental reduction and thus onto the relation to death and originary writing. 13 It thus consists in the self's relation to itself as different or other than itself. 14 Later, we see that this understanding of auto-affection and auto-relation as différance, as the originary possibility of writing, or as the trace, refers the transcendental subject back to the most general definition of life as leaving a trace in the world, at the same time as it accounts for life's evolution. In other words, we find in différance the point of departure for telling the history of life.
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At this point, the deconstruction of phenomenological voice and thus of consciousness requires one last step. If the privileging of voice over the other media of signification seems to be linked to its purely temporal structure-the fact that it is given in the present-then the movement of différance must have already been at work within the "temporal fabric" of voice (71). 16 To demonstrate this claim, Derrida recalls a passage from the lectures on the
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time in which
Husserl describes the movement of temporalization as pure auto-affection-namely, genesis spontanea. 17 I cannot engage with Derrida's analyses of this immense philosophical problem here, and limit myself to highlighting his argument and its effects on the problem of the history of life. Derrida suggests that what Husserl calls genesis spontanea is the process by which the now constitutes itself by making itself into a retention or a retentional trace. He describes this process as follows: "the living now, producing itself by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now, be retained in another now, must affect itself, without empirical recourse, with a new originary actuality in which it will become a non-now as a past now" (VP 72-73).
Ultimately, the movement of temporalization as pure auto-affection would have already been the movement of différance or of the originary possibility of writing-here designated as archi-writing:
The living present arises on the basis of its non-self-identity, and on the basis of the retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace is unthinkable if we start from the simplicity of a present whose life would be interior to itself. The self of the living present is originarily a trace. The trace is not an attribute about which we could say that the self of the living present "is originarily" the trace. It is necessary to think originary-being from the trace and not the trace from originary-being. This archiwriting is at work in the origin of sense. (VP 73)
Not only can the living present not be dissociated from the trace; above all, the living present turns out to be reinscribed within the history of life as leaving a trace in the world. First, as
Derrida points out, the movement of temporalization described above calls into question the privileging of phenomenological voice as a merely temporal structure. to the activity of recollection, a passage which "produces" ideality and pure
Objectivity as such and makes other absolute origins appear as such, is always described by Husserl as an already given essential possibility, as a structural ability whose source is not made a problem. Perhaps this source is not questioned by phenomenology because it is confused with the possibility of phenomenology itself.
In its "factuality," this passage is also that of the lower forms of Nature and conscious Derrida that the general structure of the trace is another name for life, we may ask how this structure has been-and is yet to be-articulated across the history of life and evolution.
Derrida addresses this question in a passage from Of Grammatology (1967), where he suggests that we need to take up again the indiscernibility of the elements of idealization and consciousness from différance and the trace. From this perspective, we understand the articulations of life as related to the degree of mastery that the living has over its own possibility, or power, of repeating the ideal object. Derrida thus explains:
This possibility-another name for "life"-is a general structure articulated by the history of life, and leading to complex and hierarchical operations. Auto-affection, the as-for-itself or for-itself-subjectivity-gains in power and in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself. Here idealization is the movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects me or serves me as Animality, the life of the living, at least when one claims to be able to distinguish it from the inorganic, from the purely inert or cadaverous physico-chemical, is generally defined as sensibility, irritability, and auto-motricity, a spontaneity that is capable of movement, of organizing itself and affecting itself, marking, tracing, and affecting itself with traces of its self. This auto-motricity as auto-affection and relation to itself is the characteristic recognized as that of the living and of animality in general, even before one comes to consider the discursive thematic of an utterance or of an ego cogito, more so of a cogito ergo sum. But between this relation to the self (this Self, this ipseity) and the I of the "I think," there is, it would seem, an abyss … No one has ever denied the animal this capacity to track itself, to trace itself or retrace a path of itself. Indeed, the most difficult problem lies in the fact that it has been refused the power to transform those traces into verbal language, to call to itself by means of discursive questions and responses, denied the power to efface its traces. (AIA 49-50) 22 In Derrida's reproduction of the modern narrative on animal and human auto-relation, the "I think" seems to share with the phenomenological concept of consciousness the feature of the self-presence of the living present in the element of speech. This narrative also seems to associate a certain ability to respond, or responsibility, to the human self that is present to itself and hears itself speak. As it is suggested in the aforementioned passage (see the reference to the cogito), Derrida finds in the Cartesian conception of the human self as "I think" the very presupposition of this narrative. 23 first, "the whole mechanical structure [toute cette machine] of limbs"; secondly, the fact that "I was nourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense-perception, and thinking." 24 Interestingly, Descartes attributes these "actions" to a "soul" that he imagines "to be something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether" (Meditations 17). According to Derrida, these traits associated with a physical soul identify what Descartes understands by life or animality.
"Each time that … he has to evoke these signs of life or animation-therefore of animalityconstituted by auto-affection or auto-motion," Derrida points out, "he relates them to a living soul that … can only be a body" (AIA 72). As the reductions follow one another, Descartes comes to the point of determining the pure "I am" as a thinking thing. He writes: "Thinking?
At last I have discovered it-thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist-that is Suppose that a man had been brought up all his life in some place where he had never seen any animals except men; and suppose that he was very devoted to the study of mechanics, and had made, or helped to make, various automatons shaped like a man, a horse, a dog, a bird, and so on, which walked and ate, and breathed, and so far as possible imitated all the other actions of the animals they resembled, including the signs we use to express our passions, like crying when struck and running away when subjected to a loud noise. Suppose that sometimes he found it impossible to tell the difference between the real men and those which had only the shape of men, and had learnt by experience that there are only the two ways of telling: … first, that such automatons never answer in word or sign, except by chance, to questions put to them;
and secondly, correspond that though their movements are often more regular and certain than those of the wisest men, yet in many things which they would have to do to imitate us, they fail more disastrously than the greatest fools. (The Philosophical Writings 99-100)
From this fiction, according to Descartes, we should be able to reconsider our judgment before real animals. 25 We should understand that "the resemblance between some exterior actions of animals and our own … is not at all a sufficient basis to prove that there is any resemblance between the corresponding interior actions" (The Philosophical Writings 100).
Derrida draws attention to the fact that Descartes's argument hinges on the presupposition of a limit or a threshold for the animal, that is, the ability to not react to a programmable question, like an automaton, but "to [freely] respond to true questioning" (AIA 82-83). 26 The metaphysical determination of the human self as a self-present thinking thing secures this ability and thus marks the limit between animal and human auto-relation. As anticipated, Derrida formalizes this divide/abyss between animality and the human as the divide/abyss between two kinds of auto-relation, between auto-affection and "I think." On the one hand,
we have the way the living relates to itself by demarcating itself from the physico-chemical domain of the inorganic (auto-affection, automotion, etc.). On the other hand, we have the self-present thinking thing that Derrida designates as auto-deictic and auto-monstrative autotelicity (autotélie). He has the following formulation of these new concepts of "auto-telicity"
and "auto-deicticity":
Every living creature, and thus every animal to the extent that it is living, has recognized in it this power to move spontaneously, to feel itself and to relate to itself.
However problematic it be, that is even the characteristic of what lives, as traditionally conceived in opposition to the inorganic inertia of the purely physico-
chemical … But what is in dispute … is the power to make reference to the self in deictic or autodeictic terms, the capability at least virtually to turn a finger toward oneself in order to say "this is I" … It is what says "I am speaking of me"; the one who says "I" shows himself in the present of his utterance, or at least of its manifestation. Because it is held to be incapable of this autodeictic or auto-referential self-distancing [autotélie] and deprived of the "I," the animal will lack any "I think,"
as well as understanding and reason, response and responsibility. (AIA 94) 27 Here Derrida makes explicit that human auto-relation, that is, the Cartesian presupposition of the modern narrative of life, consists in the metaphysical axiom of the coincidence of voice and consciousness that grants the self-presence and self-proximity of transcendental life. As we know, this axiom presupposes the dissimulation of the process of death and signification that has always been at work in voice and consciousness. For Derrida, it is precisely the deconstruction of this axiom that liberates the history of life and allows us to tell this history.
Therefore, he sketches a "critical reelaboration" of the modern narrative of life that hinges on the deconstruction he had initiated many years earlier in Voice and Phenomenon. This reelaboration does not limit itself to pointing to examples of autodeictic autotelicity in animal life-such as in genetic systems as well as in social phenomena of narcissistic exhibition.
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Above all, it is a matter of calling into question the metaphysical axiom in itself, "the axiom that permits one to accord purely and simply to the human or to the rational animal that which one holds the just plain animal to be deprived of" (AIA 95). 29 From this re-elaboration, it follows that the Cartesian distinction between human and animal auto-relation, between "I think" and auto-affection, and thus the very principle of the modern narrative of life, are reinscribed within the ultra-transcendental conception of life as leaving a trace in the world.
Derrida writes:
If autoposition, the automonstrative autotely of the "I," even in the human, implies the "I" to be an other that must welcome within itself some irreducible hetero-affection (as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere), then this autonomy of the "I" can be neither pure nor rigorous; it would not be able to form the basis for a simple and linear differentiation of the human from the animal. (AIA 95) 30 Derrida seems to conceive of autodeictic autotelicity (whether it is animal or human) as an effect of the trace qua the possibility of repetition in general, that is, as the self's relation to the trace of the other. In so doing, he evokes another narrative of life that accounts for the history and evolution of the living. 31 Moreover, the deconstruction of the Cartesian axiom of human autotelicity propagates its effects on the concept of responsibility and its ethicopolitical developments. As we know, the ability to respond to a true questioning is structurally linked to human auto-relation ("I think") and autotelicity ("this is I") and thus relapses into the Cartesian legacy at work in the modern narrative of life. 
